UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-4-2019

Phillips v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. Appellant's Reply
Brief Dckt. 45890

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs

Recommended Citation
"Phillips v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 45890" (2019). Idaho Supreme
Court Records & Briefs, All. 7616.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7616

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
4/4/2019 4:01 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
No. 45890-2018
PENNY PHILLIPS, an individual; HUNTER PHILLIPS, an individual; and HALLE LINDSAY,
an individual,
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Respondents
v.
EASTERN IDAHO HEALTH SERVICES, INC., dba EASTERN IDAHO REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER dba BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CENTER AT EIRMC, an Idaho
corporation; MATTHEW LARSEN, DO, an individual; IDAHO BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
SERVICES, LLC dba EASTERN IDAHO RMC BEHAVIORAL HEATH, an Idaho limited
liability company,
Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants,
&
BINGHAM COUNTY, an Idaho political subdivision; BINGHAM COUNTY SHERIFF
OFFICE, an Idaho political subdivision; CRAIG T. ROWLAND, in his official capacity as
Bingham County Sheriff; JORDYN NEBEKER, an individual employed by Bingham County,
Defendants
__________________
APPELLANT REPLY/CROSS-RESPONDENT BRIEF
__________________
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville.
Honorable Bruce L. Pickett, District Judge, presiding.
__________________

John M. Avondet
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

Marvin M. Smith
2010 Jennie Lee Drive
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants/CrossRespondents

Attorneys for Defendant/Respondents/CrossAppellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL ....................................... 1
A. The District Court acted within the scope of its discretion in granting the Phillipses’
Amended Motion to Amend Scheduling Order; .................................................................. 1
B.

The Medical Defendants are not entitled to attorney fees or costs; and...................... 1

C. The Phillipses are entitled to attorney fees and costs on cross-appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. ............................................... 1
II. ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 1
A. The District Court erred when it struck Dr. Moss and his Declarations..................... 1
a. National standards. ................................................................................................. 2
b. The APA Guidelines................................................................................................ 4
c.

Dr. Moss’s discussions with Dr. Kishiyama and review of Dr. Larsen’s

testimony familiarized Dr. Moss with the standards.................................................... 6
d. Similar communities, Dr. Erwin, and indeterminability. ...................................... 8
(1) Similar communities and Pocatello patient data. .................................................. 8
(2) Dr. Erwin............................................................................................................... 11
(3) Indeterminability. ................................................................................................. 11
e.

The District Court erred in determining that Dr. Moss was not familiar with the

standard of healthcare practice relevant to EIRMC. ................................................. 15
f.

The District Court erred in determining that Dr. Moss lacked foundation to

offer an opinion as to alcohol dissipation rates. ......................................................... 16

Appellant Reply/Cross-Respondent Brief i

B.

The District Court abused its discretion when it granted the motions for summary

judgment.............................................................................................................................. 17
a. Scott’s alleged execution of the AMA form did not absolve the Medical
Defendants of liability. ................................................................................................ 18
(1) The District Court erred in applying Bevan. ....................................................... 18
(2) The District Court erred in determining the AMA form applied to Dr. Larsen.
22
(3) There were questions of fact regarding Scott’s competency at the time he
allegedly signed the AMA form................................................................................... 23
(4) There were questions of fact as to whether Scott signed the AMA form. ........... 24
b. The District Court abused its discretion in finding that EIRMC was not
vicariously liable for Dr. Larsen’s actions. ................................................................. 25
c.

The District Court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment to

IBHS............................................................................................................................. 26
C. The District Court erred when it allowed the local consultants’ depositions. ........... 26
D. The District Court erred in granting the Medical Defendants’ Motion for a
Protective Order concerning the scope of EIRMC’s 30(b)(6) deposition. ........................ 29
E.

The District Court acted within the scope of its discretion in granting the Phillipses’

Amended Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. ................................................................ 30
a. Standard of Review ............................................................................................... 30
b. Argument .............................................................................................................. 31

Appellant Reply/Cross-Respondent Brief ii

(1) Rule 16 does not require the Phillipses to establish good cause via sworn
testimony. ..................................................................................................................... 31
(2) The District Court had discretion to determine if good cause was shown to
warrant amendment of the Scheduling Order. .......................................................... 33
F.

The Medical Defendants are not entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. The

Phillipses are entitled to attorney fees and costs on cross-appeal...................................... 37
a. Standard of Review ............................................................................................... 37
b. The Medical Defendants are not entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. . 37
c.

The Phillipses are entitled to attorney fees and costs on cross-appeal. ............... 38

III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 39

Appellant Reply/Cross-Respondent Brief iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
A & J Const. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 116 P.3d 12 (2005).................................................. 13
Assoc. Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 733 P.2d 824 (Ct.App. 1987) ........................... 13
Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., 117 Idaho 1038, 793 P.2d 711 (1990) .................................... 18, 19
Brady v. City of Homedale, 130 Idaho 569, 944 P.2d 704 (1997)............................................... 35
Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169, 335 P.3d 14 (2014) ................................................................. 9
Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002)..................................... 34
Castorena v. Gen. Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 238 P.3d 209 (2010) ....................................... 19, 20, 22
Chicoine v. Bignall, 127 Idaho 225, 899 P.2d 438 (1995) .......................................................... 39
Coeur d’Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1026 (1990)
............................................................................................................................................. 12
Crawford v. Guthmiller, 164 Idaho 518, 432 P.3d 67 (2018) ..................................................... 37
Doe v. Doe (2016-7), 161 Idaho 67, 383 P.3d 1237 (2016) ........................................................ 37
Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 45 P.3d 816 (2002) ............................ 7
Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 902, 367 P.3d 1214 (2016) ..................................................... 37
Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006).......................................................... 30
Esterbrook v. State, 124 Idaho 680, 863 P.2d 349 (1993) .......................................................... 22
Garriott v. W. Med. Assocs., PLLC, 2017 WL 3288596 (D. Idaho Aug. 2, 2017) ...................... 16
Grisinger v. Hubbard, 21 Idaho 469, 122 P. 853 (1912) ............................................................ 33
Hammer v. Barth, 48 N.E.3d 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2016) .......................................................... 25
Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469, 299 P.3d 781 (2013) ........................................................... 30
Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 178 P.3d 597 (2008) ............................................................... 13
Hoene v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 752, 828 P.2d 315 (1992) ........................................................ 14, 15
Hoover v. Hunter, 150 Idaho 658, 249 P.3d 851 (2011)............................................................... 2
J.I.Case Co. v. McDonald, 76 Idaho 223, 280 P.2d 1070 (1955)................................................ 12
Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 206 P.3d 473 (2009) ................... 25
Knowlton v. Mudd, 116 Idaho 262, 775 P.2d 154 (Ct.App. 1989) .............................................. 24
Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 828 P.2d 854 (1992).............................................................. 5
Lanham v. Fleenor, 164 Idaho 355, 429 P.3d 1231 (2018)……………………………………...38
Lepper v. E. Idaho Health Servs., Inc., 160 Idaho 104, 369 P.3d 882 (2016) ............................. 13
Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954) ................................................................ 13
Martinez v. Moroldo, 160 A.D.2d 387 (N.Y. App. 1990) .......................................................... 24
McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 303 P.3d 578 (2013) ....................................................... 13
Mercy Medical Center v. Ada Cty., Bd. of Ct. Com’rs of Ada Cty., 146 Idaho 226, 192 P.3d 1050
(2008) ................................................................................................................................... 34
Morgan v. Demos, 156 Idaho 182, 321 P.3d 732 (2014) ............................................................ 32
Morrison v. St. Luke’s Reg’l Med. Ctr., Ltd., 160 Idaho 599, 377 P.3d 1062 (2016) .................... 5
Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816 (2000)............................. 7, 8
Petrus Family Trust v. Kirk, 163 Idaho 490, 415 P.3d 358 (2018) ....................................... 38, 39

Appellant Reply/Cross-Respondent Brief iv

Quigley v. Kemp, 162 Idaho 408, 398 P.3d 141 (2017) ........................................................ 27, 28
Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944).............................................................. 19, 21
Samples v. Hanson, 161 Idaho 179, 384 P.3d 943 (2016) ...................................................... 3, 11
State ex rel. Rich v. McGill, 79 Idaho 467, 321 P.2d 595 (1958) (Keeton, C.J., dissenting) ........ 33
Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 254 P.3d 11 (2011) .................................................... 16
Taylor v. Chamberlain, 154 Idaho 695, 302 P.3d 35 (2013) ...................................................... 32
Tucker v. Palmer, 112 Idaho 648, 735 P.2d 959 (1987) ............................................................. 22
Turner v. Turner, 155 Idaho 819, 317 P.3d 716 (2013).............................................................. 39
Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 985 P.2d 669 (1999) .......................................................... 19
Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180 (2007) ........................ 16, 17, 23
Statutes
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-121 (2019) ..................................................................................... 38, 39
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-311 (2017)............................................................................................. 19
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1012 (2017) ................................................................................. 3, 10, 23
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1013 (2017)........................................................................................... 23
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-326 (2017) ............................................................................................. 6
Rules
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (2019) .......................................................................................................... 36
IDAHO APP. R. 40 (2019) ..................................................................................................... 37, 39
IDAHO APP. R. 41 (2019) ..................................................................................................... 37, 39
IDAHO R. CIV. P. 16 (2019).................................................................................................. 31, 33
IDAHO R. CIV. P. 26 (2019)........................................................................................................ 26
IDAHO R. CIV. P. 4 (2019) ......................................................................................................... 32
IDAHO R. CIV. P. 41 (2019)........................................................................................................ 32
IDAHO R. EVID. 702 (2017).................................................................................................. 16, 23
IDAHO R. EVID. 903 (2017)........................................................................................................ 24

Appellant Reply/Cross-Respondent Brief v

I. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL
A. The District Court acted within the scope of its discretion in granting the
Phillipses’ Amended Motion to Amend Scheduling Order;
B. The Medical Defendants are not entitled to attorney fees or costs; and
C. The Phillipses are entitled to attorney fees and costs on cross-appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41.
II. ARGUMENT
A. The District Court erred when it struck Dr. Moss and his Declarations.
As noted by counsel for the Phillipses during oral argument before the District Court on
the Medical Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and motion to strike Dr. Moss as an
expert witness, the Phillipses took a “belt, suspenders, and duct tape approach” to “ensure that
Dr. Moss had done everything possible to familiarize himself with the standard of health care
practice.” (12/21/17 Hr’g Tr. 100:6–11.) As set forth in great detail in the Phillipses’ opening
appellate brief, these efforts by the Phillipses included having Dr. Moss review medical records,
the APA guidelines, and deposition transcripts, as well as having Dr. Moss consult with local
practitioners regarding the local standard of care. Under Idaho statutory law and supporting
jurisprudence, and in light of this Court’s admonition that a district court employ “common
sense” in analyzing expert testimony in a medical malpractice test, the District Court abused its
discretion in excluding testimony from Dr. Moss and striking his declarations. See Mattox v. Life
Care Ctrs. Of Am., 157 Idaho 468, 474, 337 P.3d 627, 633 (2014). Importantly, Dr. Moss does
not need to obtain every component of his foundation from a single source. Each resource, at the
very least, provided a component of the foundation required under Section 6-1012.
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a. National standards.
As argued extensively by the Phillipses in their opening appellate brief, the District Court
erred in finding that national standards of healthcare practice did not apply and that Dr. Moss
was not familiar with those standards. (See App. Br. 11–13.) The Idaho Supreme Court has
previously acknowledged that national standards of healthcare may replace local standards.
Hoover v. Hunter, 150 Idaho 658, 662, 249 P.3d 851, 855 (2011). Under this Court’s later
decision in Mattox, in which the Court acknowledged that standards of care are “sensitive to
evolving changes in the way health care services are delivered,” national standards of care
remain a relevant, viable source of information by which to evaluate and determine applicable
standards of healthcare practice. Mattox, 157 Idaho at 474, 337 P.3d at 633.
The Medical Defendants ignore such rationale from prior Idaho Supreme Court decisions
by insisting that because Dr. Larsen was not board certified in December 2015, Dr. Larsen
cannot be held to a board certification national standard of healthcare practice. This argument,
however, misconstrues the effect of EIRMC’s internal policies and ignores key portions of Dr.
Larsen’s deposition testimony.
EIRMC’s own documents require that physicians be “board certified, board eligible, or
demonstrate that he or she has obtained the training requisite to board certification in the areas of
proposed practice.” (R., pp. 1745–46.) EIRMC required board eligible physicians to acquire the
board certification within a period of five years. (Id.) A waiver can be granted only in
“extraordinary circumstances.” (Id.) Since EIRMC only allows for extraordinary circumstances
for a waiver to be granted, it stands to reason that the “ordinary” or “standard” practice is for
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physicians to acquire board certification within the designated time period. The bylaws indicate
that an individual who can receive consideration for a waiver must, among other things, have
“achieved extraordinary recognition in the field of medicine as related to the needed talents
documented by the Credentials Committee.” (Id.) Hence, IBHS, EIRMC’s exclusive contractor
for the inpatient services at BHC, requires new hires to be board eligible or board certified. (Id.,
p. 1698.) The fact that a waiver can be subsequently granted by EIRMC for extraordinary
reasons should make no difference whether the community standard of healthcare practice is
consistent with board certification. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1012 (2017).
EIRMC has established a policy that its physicians should practice consistent with board
certification standards either through acquisition of the actual certification or through having the
knowledge, training, and skill necessary to become board certified. (See R., pp. 1698, 1745–46.)
A physician’s lack of certification, in light of EIRMC’s requirements, is immaterial to whether a
national standard of healthcare practice applies because every physician should have the skills,
training, and education commensurate with board certification. Because EIRMC held itself out as
a facility who employs board certified or board eligible physicians,1 with limited, extraordinary
exceptions, it and its practitioners, including Dr. Larsen, should be held to the standards of board
certification. Samples v. Hanson, 161 Idaho 179, 183, 384 P.3d 943, 947 (2016). Its policy of
requiring board certification for physicians arguably determines the community standard
pursuant to the language found in Idaho Code Section 6-1012.

1

And requires board eligible physicians to become board certified within five years of hire or acquire one of the
extraordinary waivers.
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Further, as noted in the Phillipses’ earlier briefing, Dr. Larsen testified that he was board
eligible in December 2015, and that he encountered no new medical principles when he studied
for his September 2016 board exam. (R., p. 1566, Dep. 87:9–16; p. 1567, Dep. 92:21–25.) Dr.
Larsen also testified that nothing in the September 2016 board exam conflicted with the
standards of healthcare practice he had observed since beginning work at BHC in August 2015,
which indicates that the national standard of healthcare practice was akin to the Idaho Falls
standard of healthcare practice in December 2015. (Id., p. 1568, Dep. 96:5–14.)
Under Idaho precedent, including cases from this Court recognizing the evolving changes
to healthcare services and the potential relevance of national standards of healthcare practice, and
given EIRMC’s internal policies regarding physician certification, as well as Dr. Larsen’s
deposition testimony, the national standard of healthcare practice was relevant in determining the
Idaho Falls standard of care in December 2015. The District Court abused its discretion in
finding that national standards of healthcare practice did not apply.
b. The APA Guidelines.
The Medical Defendants assert that because the APA guidelines state that the guidelines
“are not intended to be construed or to serve as a standard of medical care,” the APA guidelines
cannot establish a standard of healthcare practice. (See Resp. Br. 9; R., p. 683.) However, this
argument misses the point—the fact that the guidelines may be advisory does not prohibit them
from constituting the standard of healthcare practice in any given community through voluntary
actions of the practitioners.
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Dr. Denny testified during his deposition that the community of Idaho Falls held itself to
the standards of healthcare practice articulated by the APA guidelines during the timeframe in
question. (Am. Supp. R., pp. 95–96, Dep. 44:4-47:16.) Dr. Denny admitted in his deposition that
the psychiatrists and staff he associated with at BHC all followed the APA standards. (Id.) The
staff members discussed by Dr. Denny included the hospitalists and, specifically, Dr. Larsen.
(Id.) According to Dr. Denny’s deposition testimony, psychiatrists in Idaho Falls practiced
consistent with APA guidelines and standards in December 2015. (Id.)
In an attempt to get past this Court’s decisions in Morrison v. St. Luke’s Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
Ltd., 160 Idaho 599, 377 P.3d 1062 (2016), and Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 828 P.2d 854
(1992), the Medical Defendants assert that Dr. Denny’s testimony about the local standard of
care was equivocal and insufficient to identify a local standard of care or determine that a
national standard of care had supplanted the local standard of care in December 2015. (Resp. Br.
10.) However, this is an inaccurate representation of Dr. Denny’s testimony.
Dr. Denny conceded that he followed the APA guidelines as the standard of healthcare
practice in December 2015 for patients he treated at BHC. (Am. Supp. R., pp. 95–96, Dep. 44:447:16.) Dr. Denny admitted he was familiar with the standard of healthcare practice for
psychiatrists in Idaho Falls during 2015. (Id., p. 96, Dep. 45:12-15.) In response to a question of
whether the APA guidelines applied to the practice of psychiatry at BHC, Dr. Denny testified
that based on his experience, even taking into consideration the fact that he could not “direct and
control” the actions of others, that he followed national standards, APA standards, and “that in
my working with Behavioral Health Center that I followed those standards and the staff that I
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work with followed those standards. And, therefore, I can say that in the context of my personal
experience, yes.” (Id., Dep. 46:6-19.) Dr. Denny then included Dr. Larsen within the definition
of BHC staff. (Id., Dep. 47:13-16.)
Dr. Larsen’s subsequent disagreement with Dr. Denny regarding the local standard of
healthcare practice did not render Dr. Denny’s testimony equivocal, incoherent, or irrelevant
regarding the local standard of healthcare practice. Contrary to the Medical Defendants’ position,
Idaho Code § 6-1013 does not limit admissible testimony to testimony on which all experts or
practitioners universally agree; indeed, such an onerous standard would be impossible for a
plaintiff to satisfy. Instead, under Idaho Code § 6-1013, Dr. Moss appropriately relied on Dr.
Denny’s deposition testimony to familiarize himself with the local standard of healthcare
practice, including the implementation of the APA guidelines in the local community.
c. Dr. Moss’s discussions with Dr. Kishiyama and review of Dr.
Larsen’s testimony familiarized Dr. Moss with the standards.
The Medical Defendants maintain that the “difference between inpatient and outpatient
psychiatry in the context of an involuntary mental health hold is paramount in this case,” such
that Dr. Kishiyama could not familiarize Dr. Moss with the local standard of care. (Resp. Br. 13.)
This argument, however, is specious reasoning designed to conflate the question of whether the
Medical Defendants were negligent in admitting and holding Scott voluntarily with the broad
application of Idaho Code § 66-326. Idaho Code § 66-326, the statute on which Dr. Larsen
would have relied to place an involuntary hold on Scott, does not refer to outpatient vs. inpatient
situations. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-326 (2017). The Medical Defendants are attempting to
create a distinction without a difference in order to obfuscate the reality that Dr. Kishiyama, who
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is a member of the same medical specialty as Dr. Larsen and who practiced in Idaho Falls in
December 2015, satisfies Dulaney’s requirements of time, place, and specialty. (R., pp. 160110.) Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002). Dr.
Kishiyama’s discussions with Dr. Moss, particularly when viewed in light of the other
information reviewed by Dr. Moss, familiarized Dr. Moss with the standard of healthcare
practice and foundation pursuant to Section 6-1013.
Likewise, Dr. Moss’s review of Dr. Larsen’s testimony regarding Dr. Moss’s earlier
declaration also familiarized Dr. Moss with the local standard of care. The Phillipses previously
directed this Court to its prior holding in Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,
995 P.2d 816 (2000). (App. Br. 16.) The Medical Respondents argue that Perry is inapplicable to
the underlying action, as the nursing expert in Perry “did much more than simply rely on a
medical defendant’s statement of the standard of care; the nursing expert also spoke with the
executive director of the Idaho Board of Nursing and two faculty members at Idaho nursing
schools.” (Resp. Br. 14.) It is difficult to see how Perry is inapplicable to the underlying action—
just as the nursing expert in Perry sought to determine the local standard of care from multiple
sources, Dr. Moss likewise obtained information regarding the local standard of care in Idaho
Falls in December 2015 from multiple sources, as set forth more fully in the Phillipses’ opening
brief. (App. Br. 10–23.)
Further, Perry expressly provides that “[a]n expert’s review of a deposition stating that
the local standard does not vary from the national standard, coupled with the expert’s personal
knowledge of the national standard, is sufficient to lay a foundation for the expert’s opinion.”
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Perry, 134 Idaho at 51, 995 P.2d at 821. This is more than a mere suggestion, as argued by the
Medical Defendants; instead, under the plain language of Perry, a medical defendant’s
description of the standard can be sufficient and should be sufficient for an expert witness to rely
upon. Id.
The Medical Defendants also argue that because Dr. Larsen corrected what he perceived
to be inaccuracies in Dr. Moss’s declaration regarding the local standard of healthcare practice,
Dr. Larsen was not affirmatively stating a standard of practice. However, such an argument is
untenable, as Dr. Larsen’s corrections to Dr. Moss’s declaration served to correct and identify
the local standard—otherwise, Dr. Larsen’s corrections serve no other purpose. Moreover, even
if Dr. Larsen’s corrections alone did not affirmatively state the standard, they constitute a portion
of the information Dr. Moss relied upon for foundation.
Ultimately, both Dr. Moss’s discussion with Dr. Kishiyama, as well as Dr. Larsen’s
review of Dr. Moss’s prior declaration regarding the local standard of care, served to familiarize
Dr. Moss with the local standard of healthcare practice in Idaho Falls during December 2015.
These sources of information, as well as others relied upon by Dr. Moss, satisfied the
foundational requirements for purposes of Idaho Code § 6-1013.
d. Similar communities, Dr. Erwin, and indeterminability.
(1)

Similar communities and Pocatello patient data.

The District Court erred in oversimplifying the import of the Pocatello patient data
provided by the Phillipses. In concluding that the Pocatello patient data, which established that
EIRMC served approximately two percent of Pocatello’s total population, demonstrated only
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“the miniscule number of Pocatello residents treated in Idaho Falls,” the District Court failed to
engage in the analysis of the data provided for the purpose of determining whether Idaho Falls
and Pocatello are similar communities under Idaho Code § 6-1012. (R., p. 2433.) The Medical
Defendants argue further that such information, without “additional comparative data to provide
further context and comparison,” is “an incomplete record.” (Resp. Br. 18–19.) Both the position
taken by the District Court and that espoused by the Medical Defendants attempt to artificially
inflate the requirements for establishing that two locations are part of the same community for
purposes of Idaho Code § 6-1012.
Contrary to the Court’s analysis and the Medical Defendants’ arguments, the statute does
not require, or provide, a quantitative threshold that has to be crossed in order for locations to be
considered part of the same community. The legislature opted for a far less precise approach.
However, the Medical Defendants’ arguments are strongly suggestive that some sort of artificial,
quantitative requirement be superimposed over the statutory language. The Court should decline
to follow their recommendations.
The Medical Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs’ offer of proof is inadequate. They rely
on Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169, 335 P.3d 14 (2014), to suggest that the absence of
information from Bingham Memorial Hospital, Mountain View Hospital, and Portneuf Medical
Center is fatal to the Phillipses’ attempts to satisfy their evidentiary burden. The arguments are
misplaced because the Phillipses showed exactly what the statute requires.
The language from Bybee that the Medical Defendants cite and rely upon is nonbinding
dicta. The language also does not create any sort of evidentiary requirement when trying to show
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that two locations are part of the same community for purposes of Idaho Code § 6-1012. In fact,
the statute does not require showing with respect to medical facilities other than the facility
where the care was to be provided. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1012 (2017). Imposing any sort of
additional requirement would only lead to increased costs of litigation that are otherwise
unnecessary and that should be avoidable, as well as a distraction to the basic issue of whether
the hospital in question ordinarily serves a location.
If one assumes that the parties received data from Bingham Memorial Hospital (BMH)
and that data showed 10,000 Pocatello patients per year seeking treatment from BMH, one must
still determine whether that is enough for Blackfoot and Pocatello to be part of the same
community. Even if the parties had that information, the question remains as to the information’s
relevance vis-à-vis whether Idaho Falls and Pocatello are part of the same community. Certainly,
one would be justified in finding that Pocatello and Blackfoot are within the same community
under Section 6-1012, given these hypothetical facts. Yet that determination has no probative
value on the question of whether Pocatello and Idaho Falls are part of the same community.
Hence, the parties should not be required to go down the rabbit hole of acquiring data from other
facilities. The statute simply does not contemplate such information being presented to answer
the question of whether two locations are really a part of the same community.
The Pocatello patient data satisfied the requirements of Idaho Code § 6-1012. The
District Court’s dismissal of the Pocatello patient data, based on the ratio of patients/residents
going from Pocatello to Idaho Falls, was erroneous.
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(2)

Dr. Erwin.

The District Court likewise abused its discretion in ruling that Dr. Erwin had a “temporal
defect” in her ability to familiarize Dr. Moss with the local standard of care. (R., pp. 2491–92.)
As established by the Phillipses in their opening brief, and pursuant to the Court’s ruling in
Samples v. Hanson, 161 Idaho 179, 384 P.3d 943 (2016), it is a matter of common sense that Dr.
Erwin would have become familiar with the standard of care in Pocatello over the course of her
career, and that she would know what the standard of care was in Pocatello in December 2015,
based on her conversations with her facility director. Under Samples, there is no requirement that
a consultant have practiced in a geographic location at the time the healthcare was provided. Id.,
at 185, 384 P.3d at 949.
While the Medical Defendants argue that this Court has never approved “such an
attenuated multi-step approach to familiarization,” the Medical Defendants do not explain why
such an approach was inappropriate in the underlying proceeding. (See Resp. Br. 19–20.)
Instead, it should not matter that Dr. Erwin had to confirm the standard of practice in December
2015 with her facility director, as both are psychiatrists who practiced in the same specialty at
the same facility. As stated in the Phillipses’ opening brief, the District Court erred in
determining that Dr. Erwin was incapable of familiarizing Dr. Moss with the local standard of
care, and the District Court should be reversed.
(3)

Indeterminability.

The District Court erred in refusing to consider the Phillipses’ argument that the standard
of healthcare practice in Idaho Falls was indeterminable and that Pocatello was a similar Idaho
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community. The District Court first had the opportunity to rule on the question of
indeterminability during oral argument on the Medical Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment and motion to strike Dr. Moss, when, in response to comments made by counsel for the
Medical Defendants, the Court inquired and counsel responded to the question of
indeterminability. (12/21/17 Hr’g Tr. 74:1-103:25.) The District Court incorrectly ruled that
indeterminability was not raised in opposition to the Medical Defendants’ motions.
The District Court then had occasion and opportunity to revisit its prior decision
regarding indeterminability upon the Phillipses’ motion for reconsideration, but refused to do so
on the basis that indeterminability was not raised in opposition to the Medical Defendants’
motions for summary judgment. (Am. Supp. R., pp. 219–20.) Though this determination ignored
the earlier indeterminability discussion before the District Court during oral argument, supra, the
District Court failed to perform the comprehensive review of law and fact (including the law and
facts supporting a finding of indeterminability) on reconsideration. Coeur d’Alene Mining Co. v.
First Nat. Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990) (quoting J.I.Case
Co. v. McDonald, 76 Idaho 223, 229, 280 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1955)). (See App. Br. 18.) Thus, the
District Court’s refusal to even consider the issue constitutes error and should warrant reversal
for consideration of the issue, at the very least.
The Medical Defendants incorrectly argue that the Phillipses are judicially estopped from
appealing and otherwise pursuing an indeterminability analysis, given the prior argument that
Idaho Falls and Pocatello are similar. (Resp. Br. 21.) However, this argument misapplies the
doctrine of judicial estoppel and ignores a fundamental component of motion practice.
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Judicial estoppel bars “a litigant who obtains a judgment, advantage, or consideration
from one party through means of sworn statements…from adopting inconsistent and contrary
allegations or testimony, to obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the
same transaction or subject matter.” Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 597, 600
(2008) (citing Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 93–94, 277 P.2d 561, 565 (1954)). “The policy
behind judicial estoppel is to protect ‘the integrity of the judicial system, by protecting the
orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of the judicial proceeding.’”
McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 894, 303 P.3d 578, 581 (2013) (quoting A & J Const. Co.
v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005)). Importantly, judicial estoppel does not
preclude a party from seeking alternative theories pursuant to Idaho’s modern motion practice
standard, under which “a plaintiff may advance alternative theories relating to an alleged set of
facts.” Assoc. Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct.App. 1987)
(internal citation omitted).
Under principles of civil procedure, the Phillipses were entitled to argue both that Idaho
Falls and Pocatello were similar communities, or, that alternatively, the standard of healthcare
practice in Idaho Falls was indeterminable. Contrary to the Medical Defendants’ argument,
judicial estoppel does not operate to forestall the Phillipses’ ability to argue indeterminability.
The Medical Defendants likewise erroneously argue that the Phillipses are precluded
from arguing indeterminability because they did not satisfy a threshold burden under Lepper v.
Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc., 160 Idaho 104, 369 P.3d 882 (2016). (Resp. 21–22.)
Specifically, the Medical Defendants argue that the Phillipses must have demonstrated concerted
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efforts to contact like providers in the community before the Phillipses could argue that the
standard of healthcare practice in Idaho Falls in December 2015 was indeterminable. (Id. at 22.)
However, the Medical Defendants’ argument that the standard of care was determinable under
Lepper is unavailing.
In this case, the defendant physician, Dr. Larsen, is a hospitalist who works and sees
patients at BHC. Dr. Larsen’s office is located at BHC. (R., p. 1573, Larsen Dep. 184:17-20.) Dr.
Larsen is limited to seeing and treating at BHC only those patients admitted to EIRMC. (Id., pp.
1697–1720.) This is ostensibly true for all psychiatrists employed by IBHS. (Id.) The Medical
Defendants argue that because there are five psychiatrists in Idaho Falls with admitting
privileges at EIRMC, the standard of healthcare practice is therefore determinable. However,
none of those psychiatrists are similarly situated to Dr. Larsen, as none are hospitalists. Nor do
the affidavits addressing the five psychiatrists in Idaho Falls establish that any of the
psychiatrists actually saw individuals at BHC on an inpatient basis. (See R., pp. 2846–52.) Just
because the unidentified psychiatrists had admitting privileges does not mean that they actually
admitted and then treated patients on an inpatient basis at EIRMC.
In Hoene, all six of the physicians practiced as a single practice group. Hoene v. Barnes,
121 Idaho 752, 754, 828 P.2d 315, 317 (1992). Here, all inpatient psychiatric services in Idaho
Falls are provided at BHC. As far as the evidence goes, there may be psychiatrists who have
admitting privileges, but there is no evidence as to what that means. The record does not
establish that the psychiatrists who admit patients to BHC do not turn over their patients to the
hospitalists upon admission, as is done by Dr. Denny.
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None of the outside psychiatrists are hospitalists like Dr. Larsen. The fact that they have
admitting privileges is immaterial to whether the standard of healthcare practice for inpatient
psychiatric treatment is indeterminable. Dr. Denny is not a hospitalist; however, he is under
contract with EIRMC to take call and admit patients. (Am. Supp. R., p. 94.) Dr. Denny would
take call and admit patients who needed to go to BHC during the time when he was on call. (Id.,
pp. 93–94, Dep. 24:13-27:17.) Dr. Denny explained that when he was called to admit a patient he
would provide admission orders and that would be “his last contact in terms of the patient.” (Id.,
p. 94, Dep. 26:10-11.) Patients would then be turned over to hospitalists in the morning after a
nighttime admission. (Id., pp. 93–94, Dep. 24:13-27:17.)
There is only one facility where inpatient psychiatric services can be provided: EIRMC’s
BHC. Because BHC was the only facility providing inpatient psychiatric services in December
2015, BHC should be considered a single provider. See Hoene, 121 Idaho at 754, 828 P.2d at
317. As such, Lepper does not preclude the Phillipses from arguing indeterminability, and the
Court abused its discretion by failing to consider the issue during the proceedings below.
e. The District Court erred in determining that Dr. Moss was not
familiar with the standard of healthcare practice relevant to
EIRMC.
The District Court abused its discretion in holding that Dr. Moss was not familiar with
the standard of healthcare practice relevant to EIRMC. The EIRMC Standard of Care documents,
self-generated by EIRMC, describes a standard of care for services provided at BHC, and
“add[ed] to the expert’s knowledge of the local standard in order to meet the foundation
requirements of I.C. § 6-1013.” Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 118, 254 P.3d 11, 19, n.
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8 (2011). It is undisputed that Dr. Denny and Dr. Larsen each agreed with the EIRMC Standard
of Care document and testified it was accurate, with one minor change, and that it applied to
them. (R., pp. 1527–28, Dep. 39:24–43:4; p. 1580, Dep. 218:7–220:21.) The Medical Defendants
argue that neither Dr. Denny nor Dr. Larsen testified that the EIRMC Standard of Care document
comprised the entirety of the community standard of health care practice for EIRMC or
psychiatrists in the community; however, such argument again ignores that a court should
consider all evidence supporting an expert witness’s opinion as a whole. Garriott v. W. Med.
Assocs., PLLC, 2017 WL 3288596, at *9 (D. Idaho Aug. 2, 2017). The EIRMC Standard of Care
document, generated by EIRMC and produced by EIRMC in discovery, and which was
confirmed to be in agreement with the standard of care for services provided at BHC during
December 2015 by two physicians, provided Dr. Moss with information to support Dr. Moss’s
understanding of the standard of healthcare practice relevant to EIRMC, and the District Court
erred in ruling that Dr. Moss was not familiar with the standard of care relevant to EIRMC.
f. The District Court erred in determining that Dr. Moss lacked
foundation to offer an opinion as to alcohol dissipation rates.
The District Court abused its discretion in determining Dr. Moss lacked foundation to
offer an opinion as to alcohol dissipation rates. Dr. Moss’s opinions regarding alcohol dissipation
rates is a matter of admissibility under the Rules of Evidence. “The test for determining whether
a witness is qualified as an expert is ‘not rigid’ and can be found in Idaho Rule of Evidence 702.”
Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007) (internal
citation omitted). “A knowledgeable expert is one who possesses ‘knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education.” Id. (citing IDAHO R. EVID. 702 (2007)). Formal training is not required.

Appellant Reply/Cross-Respondent Brief 16

Weeks, 143 Idaho at 837, 153 P.3d at 1183. The “question under the evidence rule is simply
whether the expert’s knowledge will assist the trier of fact; not whether the information upon
which the expert’s opinion is based is commonly agreed upon.” Id., 143 Idaho at 838, 153 P.3d
at 1184. “The focus of the court’s inquiry is on the ‘principles and methodology’ used, not the
conclusions they generate.” Id. (citations omitted).
Dr. Moss is a psychiatrist with significant training, experience, and skill. (R., pp. 1220–
1238.) Dr. Moss has experience with the “treatment of addiction including alcohol, drugs, and
prescription medications.” (Id., pp. 1248–49.) He reviewed the medical records and testimony
identified in his report. Dr. Moss based his opinions, in part, on his knowledge, training,
experience, and skill associated with his extensive practice of psychiatry. (Id., pp. 1220–1238.)
Dr. Moss knows the rate of alcohol dissipation based on his experience, training, and skill. (Id.,
p. 1233.) That is his foundation and it was sufficient for him to offer admissible testimony.
The Medical Defendants’ objections to Dr. Moss’s opinions regarding alcohol dissipation
do not render Dr. Moss’s opinions inadmissible under Rule 702. Instead, such objections go to
the weight, not admissibility, of Dr. Moss’s testimony, and the determination of whether Scott
was intoxicated should have remained a question of fact for the jury to decide. The District Court
abused its discretion in determining that Dr. Moss lacked foundation to testify regarding alcohol
dissipation rates.
B. The District Court abused its discretion when it granted the motions for
summary judgment.
The District Court abused its discretion when it granted summary judgment in favor of
the Medical Defendants. As argued in the Phillipses’ appellant brief, and as set forth in additional
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detail below, infra, the District Court incorrectly applied Idaho precedent in determining that
Scott’s alleged execution of the Leaving Hospital Against Medical Advice (AMA) form absolved
the Medical Defendants, including Dr. Larsen, of liability to the Phillipses. Likewise, there were
genuine issues of material fact regarding Scott’s alleged execution of the AMA form, including
whether Scott was competent to so act at the time. Further, there were general questions of
material fact regarding whether Scott reasonably believed Dr. Larsen was an agent of EIRMC
under the principle of apparent authority. These factual questions precluded summary judgment,
and the District Court erred in awarding summary judgment to the Medical Defendants.
a. Scott’s alleged execution of the AMA form did not absolve the
Medical Defendants of liability.
As briefed extensively by the Phillipses in their opening appellate brief, the District Court
erred in its reliance on Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., 117 Idaho 1038, 793 P.2d 711 (1990), for its
holding that Scott’s alleged execution of the AMA form bound the Phillipses and absolved the
Medical Defendants of liability to the Phillipses. (See App. Br. 24–32.) In addition, because there
were questions of fact regarding Scott’s competency at the time he allegedly signed the AMA
form, as well as questions of fact as to whether Scott actually signed the AMA form, the District
Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Medical Defendants.
(1)

The District Court erred in applying Bevan.

The District Court, in its decision granting summary judgment in favor of the Medical
Defendants, determined that Scott’s execution of the AMA form bound the Phillipses from
asserting wrongful death claims against the Medical Defendants. (R., p. 2448.) In so holding, the
District Court relied on Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., a comparative negligence case, for the
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proposition that “if a defendant could not have been liable to the decedent, then neither can the
defendant be held liable to the heirs of the decedent.” (Id.) Given the District Court’s decision in
favor of the Medical Defendants, the Medical Defendants naturally cling to the District Court’s
reasoning relating to Bevan. However, as noted in the Phillipses’ prior brief, and as set forth in
detail below, infra, the District Court erred in oversimplifying the Court’s holding in Bevan.
The Idaho Supreme Court’s holding in Bevan articulates the linchpin principle that a
condition precedent to all wrongful death actions is that a defendant must have committed a
wrongful act or neglect against the decedent. (App. Br. 24–25.) See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5311 (2017); Castorena v. Gen. Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 617, 238 P.3d 209, 217 (2010); Russell v.
Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 540–41, 148 P.2d 221, 223 (1944). The Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed this
principle in Turpen v. Granieri, a case utterly ignored by the Medical Defendants, in which the
Court cited its past decision in Bevan and continued, “Thus, the heir must prove that the
wrongful act or negligence of the defendant caused the injury and resulting death.” Turpen v.
Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985 P.2d 669, 672 (1999) (citing Bevan, 117 Idaho at 1041, 793
P.2d at 714.) This statement by the Court summarizes the import of Bevan on the underlying
proceeding—rather than bar the Phillipses’ wrongful death claims against the Medical
Defendants, Bevan, as clarified by Turpen, merely stands for the proposition that a wrongful
death claim is premised on wrongful conduct or negligence on the part of the defendant against
the decedent. This holding was further clarified by the Court in Castorena v. General Electric,
which affirmed that a wrongful death claim brought by heirs of a decedent is “altogether
separate from the cause of action accruing to the person’s heirs should he die from the injury”

Appellant Reply/Cross-Respondent Brief 19

and “entirely distinct from any action the decedent may have brought on her own behalf, prior to
her death, and therefore, the accrual of the action takes place at the time of death.” 149 Idaho
609, 619, 238 P.3d 209, 219 (2010) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
The Medical Defendants attempt to obfuscate this foundational principle of wrongful
death actions by insisting that the AMA form signed by Scott was a “clear-cut example of a preinjury release of duty/express assumption of risk,” and “not a post-injury settlement of
damages.” (Resp. Br. 29.) However, in so arguing, the Medical Defendants overlook the scope of
the Phillipses’ claims against the Medical Defendants, as articulated in the Phillipses’ opening
brief. (App. Br. 30.) Specifically, the Phillipses allege the Medical Defendants were negligent in
admitting Scott to EIRMC voluntarily and in failing to place Scott on an involuntary legal hold.
These actions occurred before Scott signed the AMA form, something the Medical Defendants
disregard in their brief, other than in a callous footnote suggesting that such actions by the
Medical Defendants had no bearing on Scott’s demise, as the “injury/damage” had not yet
occurred. (See Resp. Br. 29 n. 3.) However, such specious reasoning fails to comprehend the
entirety of the Phillipses’ claims against the Medical Defendants—specifically, had the Medical
Defendants not been negligent in admitting Scott to EIRMC voluntarily and failing to place him
on an involuntary legal hold, Scott would not have been in a position to sign the AMA form and
leave the facility. The AMA form claims only to release the Medical Defendants from liability
for Scott’s departure from the facility, and not for the Medical Defendants’ prior negligent acts.
Given the events in question, including the Medical Defendants’ prior negligent acts that
are not covered under the scope of the AMA form, the AMA form is not a “clear-cut example of
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a pre-injury release of duty/express assumption of risk,” nor is it a “substantive bar” to the
Phillipses’ wrongful death claims against the Medical Defendants. Under past Idaho precedent,
as explained by this Court in Castorena, because the Medical Defendants committed an
actionable wrong against Scott (regardless of whether Scott’s claim against the Medical
Defendants would have been barred by the AMA form), which resulted in Scott’s death, the
Phillipses’ independent action against the Medical Defendants was not precluded by the AMA
form, as Scott could only waive or release his own claims. Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 539,
148 P.2d 221, 223 (1944) (superseded on other grounds) (“[T]he right of action, which accrues
on the death of the injured party, can only be prosecuted by her ‘heirs or personal
representatives’ and does not benefit the estate.”) (emphasis in original.) Accordingly, the
District Court erred in granting summary judgment for the Medical Defendants on the basis of
Scott’s alleged execution of the AMA form.
The Phillipses and the Medical Defendants have advanced competing theories of public
policy reasons vis-à-vis the effect of the AMA form on the Phillipses and their ability to pursue
their wrongful death claims against the Medical Defendants. (See App. Br. 32–33; Resp. Br. 30.)
In particular, the Medical Defendants argue that the District Court appropriately concluded that
the public policy of fairness favors enforcement of the AMA form against the Phillipses as to
their wrongful death claims against the Medical Defendants. (Resp. Br. 30.) As set forth above,
supra, the AMA form should not be enforced against the Phillipses, as 1) the Phillipses’
wrongful death claims rise in part from the Medical Defendants’ negligent behavior prior to
Scott allegedly signing the AMA form, and 2) because Scott could not release or waive the
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Phillipses’ wrongful death claims against the Medical Defendants. In addition, this Court has
spoken to the importance of fairness in the allowance of wrongful death claims, like those
asserted by the Phillipses, in Castorena, in which the Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho Code
§ 5-311 creates a new and independent cause of wrongful death action, and not a survival action:
“The reason for this interpretation is simple, practical, and fair.” Castorena v. General Elec., 149
Idaho 609, 620, 238 P.3d 209, 220 (2010). Given this Court’s prior instruction regarding the
fairness associated with wrongful death claims independent of the decedent’s underlying claims,
it is logical that fair play and other public policies favor an interpretation limiting the scope of
the AMA form’s release to claims owned solely by Scott, to the extent the AMA form is
enforceable, and not the Phillipses’ independent wrongful death claims.
(2)
The District Court erred in determining the AMA form
applied to Dr. Larsen.
The District Court erred in determining Dr. Larsen was absolved of liability to the
Phillipses under the AMA form. As noted in the Phillipses’ opening brief, Idaho jurisprudence
has established that in order for a tortfeasor to be absolved of liability under the terms of a
release, the release must include “specific language to that effect.” Esterbrook v. State, 124 Idaho
680, 683, 863 P.2d 349, 352 (1993) (citing Tucker v. Palmer, 112 Idaho 648, 651, 735 P.2d 959,
962 (1987)). The Medical Defendants’ focus on the gratuitous nature of the AMA form, as a
release, is merely an attempt to muddy the Phillipses’ argument that Dr. Larsen cannot be
released from liability under the terms of the AMA form, as EIRMC has repeatedly argued that
Dr. Larsen was not acting as its agent. (See Resp. Br. 30; App. Br. 32.) If Dr. Larsen was not
acting as an agent for EIRMC, EIRMC cannot now argue that the AMA form releases Dr. Larsen
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merely because he acted as Scott’s “attending physician.” The District Court, therefore, erred in
determining that Dr. Larsen was released from liability to the Phillipses under the AMA form.
(3)
There were questions of fact regarding Scott’s competency
at the time he allegedly signed the AMA form.
As established by the Phillipses in their opening brief, there were genuine questions of
fact regarding Scott’s competency, given his history of bipolar disorder and the fact that he had
been off of his medications for two weeks, as well as his expressions of suicidal ideation,
including a specific plan and means by which to commit suicide. It is unrefuted that bipolar
disorder, as with other mental illness, can potentially cause incompetence, as testified by Dr.
Larsen. (R., p. 1588, Dep. 257:10–258:4.) The Medical Defendants attempt to deflect this issue
by first reiterating their stance that the District Court properly struck Dr. Moss and his
declarations, and therefore Dr. Moss’s testimony regarding Scott’s competency in making a
decision to leave BHC was properly excluded. (Resp. Br. 31.) However, in so arguing, the
Medical Defendants ignore that Dr. Moss’s testimony regarding Scott’s competency in deciding
to sign the AMA form is not an opinion that falls within Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 or 6-1013, since
it is a medical opinion based on the medical record and Dr. Moss’s experience, skill, and
knowledge as a physician. (App. Br. p. 34.) See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013
(2017). Under Weeks v. East Idaho Health Servs. and Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, Dr. Moss was
qualified to opine about Scott’s competence in allegedly executing the AMA form. Weeks, 143
Idaho 834, 837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2008); IDAHO R. EVID. 702 (2017).
Given Scott’s bipolar condition, the fact that he had been off of his medications for two
weeks prior to the events in question, and Scott’s expressed suicidal ideation, and as testified to
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by Dr. Moss, there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether Scott was competent to sign the
AMA form. “It is axiomatic that in order to form a valid agreement, each party must have the
requisite mental capacity.” Knowlton v. Mudd, 116 Idaho 262, 264, 775 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.
1989). The determination of whether Scott, under the circumstances, had the requisite mental
capacity to sign the AMA form, was a question of fact incapable of disposition on summary
judgment. Id. As such, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the Medical
Defendants.
(4)
There were questions of fact as to whether Scott signed the
AMA form.
The issue of whether Scott, in fact, executed the AMA form is a question of fact that
should have been determined by the jury. See, e.g., Martinez v. Moroldo, 160 A.D.2d 387, 389
(N.Y. App. 1990) (validity of a signature is a question of fact.)
As conceded by the Medical Defendants, Penny Phillips, as Scott’s wife, can opine
regarding her belief as to the genuineness of Scott’s signature on the AMA form, pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Evidence 903. (Resp. Br. 32.) IDAHO R. EVID. 903 (2017). The Phillipses do not
dispute that Penny is not a forensic handwriting expert; however, that concession does not mean
that Penny’s testimony regarding the authenticity of Scott’s signature on the AMA form is
inadmissible or irrelevant. Instead, Penny’s testimony regarding Scott’s signature on the AMA
form is evidence that should be considered by the finder of fact when determining whether Scott
actually executed the AMA form. Accordingly, the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment to the Medical Defendants.

Appellant Reply/Cross-Respondent Brief 24

b. The District Court abused its discretion in finding that EIRMC
was not vicariously liable for Dr. Larsen’s actions.
As set forth in the Phillipses’ prior briefing, under this Court’s ruling in Jones v.
HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., the District Court erred in finding that EIRMC was not
vicariously liable for Dr. Larsen’s conduct under the doctrine of apparent agency. (App. Br. 35–
36.) Jones, 147 Idaho 109, 117–18, 206 P.3d 473, 480–81 (2009). As the non-moving party, the
Phillipses were entitled to all reasonable inferences drawn in their favor. Jones, 147 Idaho at 112,
206 P.3d at 476. The Medical Defendants utterly disregard this standard, as well as evidence in
the record generating triable issues of fact regarding Scott’s reasonable belief that Dr. Larsen
was an agent of EIRMC.
The Medical Defendants, citing Kentucky and Illinois precedent, argue that “if a patient
is on notice of a physician’s independent contractor status, a patient is usually foreclosed” from
arguing apparent authority. (Resp. Br. 33 (emphasis added).) By their own admission, the
Medical Defendants imply that apparent authority can be found in situations wherein a patient is
arguably on notice of a physician’s independent contractor status. Further, the Medical
Defendants’ reliance on the admissions form Scott signed upon arriving at EIRMC is not
dispositive for purposes of summary judgment. See Hammer v. Barth, 48 N.E.3d 769, 776–77
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2016). Instead, given the totality of the circumstances (set forth in great detail in
the Phillipses’ appellant brief), the question of whether Scott reasonably believed Dr. Larsen to
be an agent of EIRMC is a question of fact. (See App. Br. 36.) Jones, 147 Idaho at 116, 206 P.3d
at 480 (“[W]e must remand the case back to the district court for a determination of whether or
not the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that
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there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Appellants’ claim of apparent authority.”).
There is a genuine question of fact as to whether EIRMC is vicariously liable for Dr. Larsen’s
actions under the doctrine of apparent authority, and the District Court erred in granting
summary judgment to EIRMC on this issue.
c. The District Court abused its discretion in granting summary
judgment to IBHS.
As stated in the Phillipses’ opening brief, as well as for the reasons set forth in this brief,
the District Court erred in dismissing IBHS, Dr. Larsen’s employer, pursuant to its evidentiary
decision in excluding Dr. Moss’s testimony and its analysis regarding the AMA form. The
Phillipses incorporate their arguments as to the errors made by the District Court to the
Phillipses’ claims against IBHS.
C. The District Court erred when it allowed the local consultants’ depositions.
The District Court abused its discretion in allowing the depositions of Drs. Kishiyama
and Erwin, two local consulting physicians retained by the Phillipses to provide information to
Dr. Moss, the Phillipses’ testifying expert. Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26, as well as
related Idaho jurisprudence, the Phillipses satisfied the discovery requirements by identifying
Drs. Kishiyama and Erwin, and the Court erred in allowing their depositions as non-testifying
local consultants.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(D) establishes that a party may ordinarily not
discover facts known or opinions held by a retained expert who is not expected to testify at trial.
IDAHO R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(D) (2019). Rule 26 does allow for disclosure of such facts or opinions
held by a retained, non-testifying expert “on showing exceptional circumstances under which it
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is impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.” Id.
Under the plain language of Rule 26, the Phillipses have maintained that courts should not permit
local consultant depositions absent such a showing of exceptional circumstances, and that the
District Court erred in allowing the Phillipses’ local consultants to be deposed. (See App. Br.
39.) The Medical Defendants, in contrast, ignore the plain language of the statute, including the
“exceptional circumstances” limited exception to the prohibition against discovery of a local
consultant’s opinions, based on a misguided application of this Court’s holding in Quigley v.
Kemp, 162 Idaho 408, 398 P.3d 141 (2017). (Resp. Br. 35–36.)
In Quigley, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a party is required to
disclose a local consulting physician’s identity under Rule 26(b)(4)(B). Quigley, 162 Idaho at
412, 398 P.3d at 145. Notably, the Quigley Court did not address the question of whether an
opposing party may depose, even on a limited basis, a local non-testifying consultant retained by
the other party. The Medical Defendants improperly attempt to extend the reasoning, and
subsequent holding, of the Quigley Court to circumvent the language of Rule 26; however, the
holding in Quigley addresses only a party’s obligation to disclose the name of a local nontestifying consultant (not the local consultant’s opinions), if so demanded in a properly
formulated discovery request: “[Rule 26] specifically provides for the discovery of any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to a party’s claim or defense, including the identity of
persons who know of any discoverable matter” … “Dr. Kemp has a legitimate interest in
knowing who the physician assistant is so he can prepare his defense.” Id., 162 Idaho at 412, 398
P.3d at 145 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added). The Court in Quigley
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determined that learning the name of the consulting physician assistant was adequate for the
defendant doctor to prepare his defense. Id. The Medical Defendants’ argument that a medical
defendant would have “virtually no way…to discover the hypotheticals suggested by” the
Quigley Court is overwrought hyperbole that ignores the plain language of the Quigley
opinion—specifically, that learning the identification of the consulting physician assistant would
be sufficient for the defendant doctor to prepare his defense.
The Quigley Court continued, “[Rule 26’s] requirement fairly encompasses the names of
any non-testifying medical experts who provide information concerning the local standard of
care.” Id. Contrary to the Medical Defendants’ assertions, the Quigley opinion does not stand for
the proposition that a party may depose a local non-testifying consultant retained by the opposing
party, absent a showing of exceptional circumstances under Rule 26(b)(4)(D).
Nor does such a proposition logically or appropriately extend the Court’s holding in
Quigley, given the Court’s conclusory and cautionary language:
We do not make this decision lightly. We understand that finding a medical expert
who has actual knowledge of the local standard of care and who is willing to get
involved in a medical malpractice action against a colleague is difficult at best. In
some cases, it may be impossible depending on the location and specialization of
the medical provider at issue. Some may argue that our holding today will further
impede plaintiffs’ ability to get help from the local medical community …. We also
believe that secreting the identity of a medical expert who provides the foundation
for a testifying expert’s testimony is incompatible with our system of justice.
Id. (emphasis added). In its concluding remarks, the Quigley Court recognized the possibility of
a chilling effect on Idaho medical practitioners being willing to serve as non-testifying
consultants, something the Medical Defendants gloss over as “nothing more than speculation.”

Appellant Reply/Cross-Respondent Brief 28

Instead, as noted by the Quigley Court, the Court’s determination that a party could learn
the identity of a local non-testifying consultant retained by the opposing party could create a
further impediment to a medical malpractice plaintiff’s ability to satisfy its local standard of care
burden. Permitting the depositions of local non-testifying consultants, even on a limited scope,
would only further impede medical malpractice plaintiffs in securing assistance from the local
medical community, and such is neither contemplated nor expressly permitted under Rule 26 or
Quigley. The District Court therefore abused its discretion in allowing the depositions of Drs.
Kishiyama and Erwin.
D. The District Court erred in granting the Medical Defendants’ Motion for a
Protective Order concerning the scope of EIRMC’s 30(b)(6) deposition.
The District Court abused its discretion in granting the Medical Defendants’ motion for a
protective order limiting the scope of the Phillipses’ Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of EIRMC. The
Medical Defendants incorrectly argue that because questions of whether the Medical Defendants
complied with local standards is subject to expert opinion, the Phillipses are somehow precluded
from conducting discovery, including a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of EIRMC, regarding relevant
facts addressing EIRMC’s standard of practice in December 2015 for EIRMC’s psychiatrists.
Instead, the evidence the Phillipses sought from a corporate representative for EIRMC
regarding EIRMC’s standard of care for psychiatrists during the timeframe in question was a
factual underpinning in establishing what constituted the standard of care, in order that expert
witnesses could then opine as to whether a breach of that standard of care occurred. Contrary to
the Medical Defendants’ assertions, the question of what constitutes the standard of care is not
determined by the opinion of an expert witness, as there would be no true “standard” under such

Appellant Reply/Cross-Respondent Brief 29

a framework, but instead a panoply of varying “standards” dictated by each case’s respective
expert witnesses. Such a system promotes wildly inconsistent results in identically-situated
cases, and cannot be seriously viewed as a feasible manner by which to establish the local
standard of care.
Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court has previously allowed other methods by which a
retained expert may become familiar with local standards of practice, as set forth in great detail
in the Phillipses’ opening brief. (See App. Br. 41.) The Court’s prior decisions in Delaney,
Suhadolnik, Samples, and Mattox do not require expert discovery, and the District Court
improperly identified the scope of what the Phillipses sought in their Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of
EIRMC. (See id.) Notwithstanding the Medical Defendants’ unctuous statement that EIRMC, as
a business entity, is not a psychiatrist and therefore cannot opine as to the psychiatrist’s standard
of care, it remains that EIRMC should be held to provide information regarding the standard of
care of its practitioners in a particular specialty. Such information is directly relevant to the
Phillipses’ claims against the Medical Defendants, and the District Court erred in denying the
Phillipses the opportunity to conduct discovery about the standard of care for psychiatrists at
EIRMC during the timeframe in question.
E. The District Court acted within the scope of its discretion in granting the
Phillipses’ Amended Motion to Amend Scheduling Order.
a. Standard of Review
“‘When reviewing the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse of
discretion standard.’” Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469, 472, 299 P.3d 781, 784 (2013) (quoting
Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 871, 136 P.3d 338, 342 (2006)).
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b. Argument
On cross-appeal, the Medical Defendants argue that the District Court abused its
discretion because the Phillipses failed to establish good cause justifying entry of an amended
scheduling order allowing rebuttal evidence by the Phillipses. However, as established below,
supra, the District Court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion in granting the Phillipses’
Amended Motion to Amend Scheduling Order.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16 establishes that a trial court may not modify a
scheduling order “except by leave of the court on a showing of good cause or by stipulation of all
the parties and approval of the court.” IDAHO R. CIV. P. 16(a)(3) (2019). In arguing that the
District Court abused its discretion by granting the Phillipses’ Amended Motion to Amend
Scheduling Order, the Medical Defendants ask this Court to adopt a hypertechnical proverbial
line in the sand vis-à-vis what constitutes “good cause” under Rule 16, while simultaneously
ignoring Idaho precedent dictating a trial court’s discretion in determining whether good cause
has been shown.
1.
Rule 16 does not require the Phillipses to establish good
cause via sworn testimony.
The Medical Defendants first ask this Court to expand its prior particularized rulings
regarding a party’s duty to establish “good cause” under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 4(b)(2)
[formerly Rule 4(a)(2)] and 41 [formerly Rule 40(c)]. In Morgan v. Demos, a case relied upon by
the Medical Defendants, this Court affirmed its prior ruling that a plaintiff seeking to excuse its
failure in serving a defendant to a lawsuit within the six-month timeframe set forth in Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(b)(2) may do so by showing good cause “through sworn testimony by
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affidavit or otherwise setting forth facts that show good cause for failing to serve the summons
and complaint timely.” Morgan v. Demos, 156 Idaho 182, 186, 321 P.3d 732, 736 (2014)
(quoting Taylor v. Chamberlain, 154 Idaho 695, 698, 302 P.3d 35, 38 (2013); see also IDAHO R.
CIV. P. 4(b)(2) (2019). The Morgan Court likewise held that under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
41(e) [then Rule 40(c)], a party seeking retention of an inactive case “must present sworn
testimony by affidavit or otherwise setting forth facts that demonstrate good cause for retention
of a case.” Morgan, 156 Idaho at 187, 321 P.3d at 737; see also IDAHO R. CIV. P. 41(e) (2019).
The Medical Defendants erroneously insist that “[l]ogically, and per the foregoing cases,
one can only deduce that in order to make a showing of good cause under Rule 16, a party must
present sworn testimony by affidavit or otherwise setting forth facts that demonstrate good
cause.” (Resp. Br. 41.) However, this is an illogical and unsupported extension of the Court’s
narrow holdings in Taylor and Morgan, cases dealing with situations inapposite to the one before
the Court on the Medical Defendants’ cross-appeal.
In Taylor, as discussed by the Morgan Court, the Court determined that a plaintiff must
provide sworn testimony by affidavit, or by similar means, to show good cause for the plaintiffs’
failure to serve a defendant to a lawsuit within the six months mandated by Rule 4(b)(2).
Likewise, in Morgan, the Court determined that a party seeking to avoid dismissal of an inactive
case must show through sworn testimony by affidavit, or by similar means, good cause for why
the inactive case should be retained. Notably, both Taylor and Morgan address situations
wherein a party has failed to act within a timeframe articulated by the rule in question: six
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months in which to effectuate service on a defendant under Rule 4(b)(2), and 90 days in which
no action on the case has occurred, under Rule 41(e).
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16, in contrast, has no such strict timeframe in which a
party must act. Instead, Rule 16 addresses a trial court’s scheduling of upcoming deadlines in a
pending action. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 16 (2017). And while Rule 16 does require a showing of good
cause, there is no requirement under Rule 16, or in any related jurisprudence, mandating that a
party establish good cause by affidavit as to why a scheduling order should be amended. Nor
would such a requirement serve any purpose in the underlying litigation.
The Phillipses moved to amend the District Court’s scheduling order to allow the
Phillipses an allotment of time to disclose rebuttal experts, as the Court’s original scheduling
order did not include such a provision. (R., p. 1212.) It is axiomatic that the Phillipses, as the
party bringing the claims against the Medical Defendants, had the burden of proof on the claims
they made against the Medical Defendants, and the Phillipses likewise had the right to open and
close the evidence. See State ex rel. Rich v. McGill, 79 Idaho 467, 471, 321 P.2d 595, 597 (1958)
(Keeton, C.J., dissenting); see also Grisinger v. Hubbard, 21 Idaho 469, 122 P. 853, 853–54
(1912). The Medical Defendants’ arguments against amending the scheduling order ignores such
hallmarks of fair play and adjudication on the merits.
2.
The District Court had discretion to determine if good
cause was shown to warrant amendment of the Scheduling Order.
Instead, the Medical Defendants focus their argument on cross-appeal on their petition
for this Court to apply the Taylor and Morgan holdings affecting Rules 4(b)(2) and 41(e) to the
District Court’s decision to amend its scheduling order. In so arguing, the Medical Defendants
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ignore past precedent by this Court, as explained in Mercy Medical Center v. Ada Cty., Bd. of Ct.
Com’rs of Ada Cty.:
This Court has consistently held that trial courts' decisions involving application of
a “good cause” standard are discretionary decisions. See e.g., Farrell v. Bd. of
Comm'rs, Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 390–91, 64 P.3d 304, 316–17 (2002)
(considering I.R.C.P. 56(c)); Camp v. E. Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 859,
55 P.3d 304, 313 (2002) (considering late motion for summary judgment, noting
that I.R.C.P. 16(b)(6) authorizes modification of scheduling order modified upon
showing of good cause); State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 116, 29 P.3d 949, 952
(2001) (considering I.C. § 19–3501(2), noting that “[b]ecause there is no fixed rule
for determining what constitutes good cause, the matter is initially left to the
discretion of the district court.”).
146 Idaho 226, 230, 192 P.3d 1050, 1054 (2008).
In Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s
decision to permit a party to file a motion for summary judgment after the dispositive motion
deadline contained in the court’s scheduling order. 137 Idaho 850, 859–60, 55 P.3d 304, 313–14
(2002). The Court noted:
Rule 16(b)(6) provides that a scheduling order can be modified upon a showing of
good cause. In this case, the district court found that there was good cause to alter
the time periods provided in Rule 56(b) and the court’s scheduling order. The
district court based its finding upon three factors. First, Turner filed and served the
motion promptly after the court entered its judgment holding that the Ditch
Company had an easement across Camp’s land. Second, both parties were very
familiar with the issues involved in the motion for summary judgment. Third, Camp
could not show any prejudice resulting from hearing the motion on its merits. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in agreeing to hear the motion for summary
judgment.
Id. Notably, the Camp Court did not hold that a party seeking modification of a scheduling order
establish good cause by sworn testimony. See supra.
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There is no basis under Idaho law, including the Court’s prior ruling in Camp, to extend
the Court’s rulings in Taylor and Morgan—decisions addressing different and inapposite
procedural rules—to the good cause requirement of Rule 16. Instead, under Camp, the question
of whether good cause exists to modify a scheduling order remains an exercise of discretion for
the trial court, and the Medical Defendants, as the cross-appellant, bear the burden of showing
the District Court abused its discretion. Brady v. City of Homedale, 130 Idaho 569, 573, 944 P.2d
704, 708 (1997) (internal citations omitted). The Medical Defendants have failed to so establish,
and the record reflects that, pursuant to Idaho law, including this Court’s prior decision in Camp,
the District Court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion in granting the Phillipses’
Amended Motion to Amend Scheduling Order.
Finally, the Medical Defendants attack the District Court’s decision to grant the
Phillipses’ Amended Motion to Amend Scheduling Order by arguing that the Phillipses delayed
or were not diligent in moving to amend the scheduling order, therefore belying any claim for
good cause supporting amendment of the scheduling order. (See Resp. Br. 42.) In so arguing, the
Medical Defendants rely on another Idaho Supreme Court case dealing with Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 4, addressing a plaintiff’s failure to serve a defendant within six months of filing a
complaint, which, as set forth above, supra, is irrelevant to the Rule 16 inquiry in the underlying
action. (Resp. Br. 42.) The Medical Defendants likewise cite to a Ninth Circuit case interpreting
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16; the Phillipses submit that if the Court looks to other
jurisdictions regarding the interpretation of Federal Rule 16, the Court should likewise be guided
by Federal Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii), which expressly provides a default timeframe for the disclosure
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of rebuttal evidence, as set forth by the Phillipses in their briefing in support of their Amended
Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(D)(ii) (2019). (R. 1213.)
Simply put, under either Idaho or federal law, there is no support for the idea that delay or lack
of diligence on the part of a party supersedes good cause justifying modification to a scheduling
order to allow a plaintiff to submit rebuttal evidence under Rule 16.
Nor is there evidence in the record to support the Medical Defendants’ contention that the
Phillipses delayed or failed to act diligently such that the District Court abused its discretion in
granting the Phillipses’ Amended Motion to Amend Scheduling Order. As noted in prior briefing
submitted by the Phillipses, the Medical Defendants were not prejudiced by the modification to
the scheduling order, as discovery had not yet closed and the Medical Defendants had a full
opportunity to cross-examine and discover the scope of the Phillipses’ rebuttal evidence. (R., pp.
1214–15.) Instead, the Phillipses were seeking an opportunity to rebut opinions offered by the
Medical Defendants’ experts, and, as noted above, as the Phillipses were the party with the
burden of proof on the claims asserted against the Medical Defendants, the Phillipses should
have been allowed the right to disclose rebuttal evidence. (Id.)
The Phillipses’ Amended Motion to Amend Scheduling Order was properly granted by
the District Court, acting within the limits of its discretion. The Medical Defendants were not
prejudiced by the District Court’s granting of the motion. Under Idaho law, including this
Court’s holding in Camp, the District Court did not err in so acting, and the Court should affirm
the District Court’s decision granting the Amended Motion to Amend Scheduling Order.
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F. The Medical Defendants are not entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.
The Phillipses are entitled to attorney fees and costs on cross-appeal.
a. Standard of Review
Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 allow a party to affirmatively seek costs and attorney
fees on appeal. IDAHO APP. R. 40 (2019); IDAHO APP. R. 41 (2019). A basis for attorney fees
must be presented in a party’s first appellate brief in order to avoid waiver of a claim for attorney
fees. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in
any civil action “‘only if the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation.’” Crawford v. Guthmiller, 164 Idaho 518, 432 P.3d 67, 74 (2018) (quoting
Doe v. Doe (2016-7), 161 Idaho 67, 79, 383 P.3d 1237, 1249 (2016)). “‘Fees will generally not
be awarded for arguments that are based on a good faith legal argument.’” Crawford, 432 P.3d at
74 (quoting Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 902, 918, 367 P.3d 1214, 1230 (2016)). A party
prevailing on appeal is likewise entitled to costs. IDAHO APP. R. 40 (2019).
b. The Medical Defendants are not entitled to attorney fees and costs
on appeal.
The Medical Defendants concede that “the majority of the arguments raised on appeal
present novel issues of first impression.” (Resp. Br. 43.) The Medical Defendants, however, seek
an award for their attorney fees incurred in responding to the portion of the Phillipses’ argument
on appeal relating to the authenticity of Scott Phillips’s signature on the AMA form, and the
District Court’s subsequent error in granting the Medical Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment. (Id.) Specifically, the Medical Defendants argue, without any citation to legal
authority, that the Phillipses’ “continued reliance on Penny Phillips’s wholly unsupported
speculations about the authenticity of Mr. Phillips’s signature on the AMA Form” was frivolous,
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unreasonable, and unfounded. (Id.) However, as discussed in II.B.a(4), supra, Penny Phillips is
qualified to opine regarding the authenticity of Scott Phillips’s alleged signature on the AMA
form. This is evidence that should have been determined by the jury, as there is a genuine
question of fact regarding the authenticity of Scott’s signature. The Phillipses’ appeal regarding
the question of Scott’s signature on the AMA form is not frivolous, unreasonable, or unfounded
merely because the Medical Defendants disagree with the nature of the evidence proffered by the
Phillipses questioning the authenticity of the signature. Accordingly, the Medical Defendants are
not entitled to attorney fees or costs on the question of the authenticity of Scott’s signature on the
AMA form, or, indeed, on any portion of the appeal.
Additionally, attorney fees under 12-121 should be not be parsed out and awarded on an
argument by argument basis. Fees are only awardable under 12-121 if the entirety of an action or
appeal meets the standards for an award, i.e., the overall action/appeal was frivolous or without
foundation. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-121 (2019); see also Lanham v. Fleenor, 164 Idaho 355,
429 P.3d 1231, 1241 (2018).
c. The Phillipses are entitled to attorney fees and costs on crossappeal.
The Phillipses are entitled to attorney fees on cross-appeal. In arguing that the District
Court abused its discretion in granting the Phillipses’ Amended Motion to Amend Scheduling
Order, the Medical Defendants have “‘only asked the appellate court to second-guess the trial
court by reweighing the evidence or has failed to show that the district court incorrectly applied
well-established law.’” Petrus Family Trust v. Kirk, 163 Idaho 490, 503, 415 P.3d 358, 371
(2018) (quoting Idaho Military Historical Soc’y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 633, 329 P.3d
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1072, 1081 (2014)). As set forth above, the Medical Defendants’ argument on cross-appeal is
unfounded under Idaho law; nor does the Medical Defendants’ cross-appeal present a question of
first impression. “When an appellant fails to present a cogent argument as to why he should
prevail, an award to his opponent is appropriate.” Turner v. Turner, 155 Idaho 819, 827, 317
P.3d 716, 724 (2013) (citing Chicoine v. Bignall, 127 Idaho 225, 228, 899 P.2d 438, 441 (1995)).
The Medical Defendants’ cross-appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, and unfounded under Idaho
law, and the Phillipses should be awarded their attorney fees and costs on appeal. See Petrus
Family Trust, 163 Idaho at 502, 415 P.3d at 371; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-121 (2019); IDAHO
APP. R. 41 (2019); IDAHO APP. R. 40 (2019).
III. CONCLUSION
As a result of the foregoing, the Court should 1) reverse the District Court’s decision in
striking Dr. Moss as an expert witness and in striking Dr. Moss’s declarations; 2) reverse the
District Court’s decision granting summary judgment to the Medical Defendants; 3) reverse the
District Court’s decision allowing the depositions of the Phillipses’ local consulting physicians;
4) reverse the District Court’s decision granting the Medical Defendants’ motion for a protective
order concerning the scope of EIRMC’s 30(b)(6) deposition; 5) affirm the District Court’s order
granting the Phillipses’ Amended Motion to Amend Scheduling Order; and 6) remand for further
proceedings. The Phillipses should be awarded fees and costs on cross-appeal.
DATED: April 4, 2019.
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